Distributive Justice and Allocation by the Market: On the Characterisation of a Fair Market Economy by Biswas, Tapan
D I S T R I B U T I V E  J U S T I C E  A N D  A L L O C A T I O N  BY T H E  
M A R K E T :  O N  T t t E  C H A R A C T E R I S A T I O N  O F  A F A I R  M A R K E T  
E C O N O M Y  
Ta pa n  BISWAS 
De/wrlme##t of  Ecotm/nics, 6)lleet75 U#m, et:sio, Ai#Tg.~[o#7, O#ltario. k7k _;:\~6 Canada atld 
Det)arrme#~l o/ Economics, U, ivelwiO, of  Hid/, Hull ftU6 7RX U.K. 
Communicated by D.J. Ma)ston 
Received 15 January 1986 
Revised 3 November 1986 
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i .  ln l roducl ion 
Achieving social and economic  justice for its member s  is one o f  the most cherish- 
ed goals o f  every civilized society. The concept  o f  justice itself implies the existence 
o f  certain values which the society deems as just .  In n ineteenth  century England,  
the principle o f  distr ibutive justice was identified with the principle that 'happiness '  
should be dis t r ibuted amongst  people in such a way that the sum-tota l  of  happiness 
Js maximised.  This Benthamite  principle o f  'u t i l i ta r ianism'  was so much deep- roo ted  
in the nineteenth  century social ph i lo sophy  in Eng land  that  Nietzsche once remarked  
with sarcasm that  'Man  does not want  happiness ,  only an Engl i shman does! '  At the 
end of  the twentieth century,  we are aware o f  several problems with the uti l i tarian 
approach .  First, there is a p roblem of  measur ing  utility. Second,  even if utility is 
measurable ,  there is a problem with interpersonal  compar i son  of  utility. Third,  in 
lhe theory  of  distr ibutive justice, we are interested not only with the sum total of  
utility or happiness  but also how it is dis t r ibuted amongs t  the members  of  the socie- 
ty. In relatively recent past Foley (1967) came up with a remarkably  simple arid 
elegant def ini t ion of  a ' fair '  or 'equi table '  a l locat ion.  Accord ing  to Foley, an alloca- 
tion is ' equi table '  if it is characterised by the absence o f  envy among  the par- 
!icipating agents.  The approach  provided  us with a cr i ter ion of  distributive justice 
Milch had its root  in the utili tarian ph i losophy  but was not plagued with the short-  
comings of  uti l i tarianism as men t ioned  above.  It also provided a seemingly accep- 
iable ' tJtilitarian' theory o f  dis tr ibut ive justice vis-a-vis the contractual  theory of  
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justice (see Rawls, 1958, 1971, 1974). A large number  of contributions followed, 
uriticising and extending Foley's approach to distributive justice. The interested 
reader is referred to Feldman and Kirman (1974), Schmeidler and Vind (1972), 
Schmeidler  and Yaari (unpublished),  Varian (1974, 1975), Pazner and Schmeidler 
<1974, 1978). It soon became apparent  that to identify 'fairness'  with the 'absence 
of  envy' may not be the correct way of defining fairness. The moral ground behind 
such an identification was questioned by Rawls (1971). The conflict between Pareto 
optimili ty and 'fairness' as defined by Foley was brought  into light by Pazner and 
Schmeidler  (1974). In this paper, we shall develop the concept of a 'fair market  
economy '  and examine its characteristics in the context of a fair allocation of goods 
and resources in the society. Before that,  an assessment of  some previous work done 
in this area, is essential. 
2. A review of the analytic framework 
Consider  two individuals - Robert  and Mary. None of  them owns any asset but 
each of  them is endowed with one unit of  labour.  Robert  is more efficient in produc-  
tion than Mary.  So his wage-rate (w~) is greater than that of Mary (w2). The out- 
put,  produced and consumed,  is denoted by x. In Fig. 1, the budget lines for these 
persons are given by / ,M and LN respectively. The allocation (a, b) in Fig. 1 
describes a free-market equilibrium where both are on their highest attainable indif- 
ference curves. The market  equil ibrium is obviously pareto-optimal but is not fair 
according to Foley (1967) because Mary envies Robert.  In Fig. 1, assuming that the 
budget line is same for both of  them (LM), the allocation (a, c) describes the market  
equil ibrium which is ' fa ir ' .  Note, in a competit ive economy,  the wage rate equals 
the productivi ty of labour for both the individuals. Since preferences are assumed 
to be convex, Mary cannot  hire Robert  to do her work because that would imply 
Robert  demanding  a wage higher than his productivity.  
The above example raises two impor tant  questions: 
(i) When the market  ,equilibrium is not ' fa ir ' ,  is it always possible to achieve an 
al location (through a ' lump-sum tax-subsidy'  measure) which is fair in the sense that 
there is no mutual  envy present? 
(ii) In an economy with productive agents, can the 'absence of envy' be the sole 
criterion for deciding whether an al location is ' fair '  or not? In Fig. 1, for the sake 
of fairness, if a lump-sum transfer is made from Robert  to Mary, we shall not only 
be taxing Robert  for greater efficiency but also for harder work. 
The answer to the first question is disappointing.  Under  quite reasonable cir- 
cumstances a 'fair '  pareto-opt imal  allocation may not exist (see Pazner and 
Schmeidler,  1974). The second question is somewhat  uncomfor table  and has led 
economists to new concepts of ' fair  al location'  compat ible  with distributive justice. 
One such concept is due to Varian (1974, 1975) and can be described as follows. In 
the free market  equilibrium, Mary envies Robert .  Would  she be willing to work hard 
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enough to produce the amount  of  goods which Robert  is producing'? If not,  the free 
market  al location (a, b) is a ' just a l locat ion ' .  Varian calls it a fair* or W-equitable 
allocation.  If Mary or Robert  own assets or wealth, Varian would require them to 
be distributed equally. It iis easy to see that any possible free-market allocation in 
our example is a fair* allocation. If Mary is maximising her utility at 'b', then any 
other  position on the same budget line (LN) will be rejected by her. The problem 
with fair*-ness as a concept in distributive justice is that it may demand  too much 
from the inefficient person. Suppose,  producing the amount  of goods which Robert  
produces would lead Mary to work twenty-two hours a day and she refuses to do 
that,  shall we be justified in concluding that Mary deserves the poverty she is in? 
By Varian's  own (1975) admission the definit ion is conservative. However ,  Varian 
is right in emphasising thai a criterion of  ' fairness '  should also consider the relative 
efforts which the individuals put in. 
Another  well-known approach towards  distributive justice in allocation owes its 
origin to Pazner  and Schmeidler  (1978). Suppose,  there exists a hypothetical  bundle 
(the bundle ' d '  in Fig. 1) such that if both Robert  and Mary were endowed with it, 
then each of  them would have the levels o f  satisfaction which they have with alloca- 
tion (a, b). Pazner  and Schmeidler  argue that (a, b) may be considered to be a 'just 
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allocation'  because it is equivalent to the egalitarian distribution (d, d).  As in the 
case of fair*-ness, it is again easy to demonstrate  that under reasonable conditions,  
the market-al locat ion (a, b) is also an Egalitarian Equivalent Allocation (EEA). 
The appeal of  an EE-al locat ion to distributive justice is derived from the fairness 
of  the equality of endowment .  Unfortunately ,  we know that equal endowments  do 
not necessarily satisfy the requirements of distributive justice and less so those for 
procedural  justice. For example, at the point 'd '  in Fig. 1, both the individuals are 
given 'OG' goods and 'FIE' work.  As Fig. 1 suggests, both Robert  and Mary would 
have been better off  by working less and they would do so given a free choice. So 
at ' d ' ,  two of  the fundamenta l  conditions of both distributive and procedural  
justice-liberty and freedom of choice-are violated. If (d, d)  is not admissible as a 
' just al locat ion ' ,  the allocation (a, b) looses much of its strength in claiming itself 
to be distributionally just. 
3. The fair market economy 
We have seen that market  allocation ceases to be 'fair '  when the levels of  efficien- 
cy differ among  the individuals.  Why the levels of  efficiency differ? If the answer 
lies in the difference in past effort (to acquire productive skills), then Fig. I is a 
distorted presentation of  the choice problem facing Robert  and Mary.  We should 
have added the intensity of past effort to acquire skill as the third dimension (Z-axis) 
of  the choice problem. The unit interval [0, 1 ] could be used to measure the intensity 
of  effort ,  i.e., Z = 0  would imply no past effort and Z =  1 would indicate maximum 
possible effort.  Now, Robert  and Mary face the same surface as the constraint  of  
their respective choice problems. If Mary chooses to enjoy her early youth at the 
cost of a low-paid job in the future and Robert  chooses to work hard in his early 
days in return for a respectable professional career later, they are free to do so. Since 
the budget-constraint  is same for both,  it is obvious, that at the time of  making the 
choice there is no mutual  envy. If at a later stage in life Mary envies Robert ,  we can 
not argue that 'envy'  should be the criterion for ' fairness '  in this case. As Nozick 
(1974, p. 50) argued, it is ' relevant to ask whethee ' someone  did something so that 
he . - .  deserved to have a lower share. '  
It is difficult to argue with Nozick on this issue. However ,  in a large number  of 
cases, the differences in efficiency are not due to past actions but are caused by 
historic, hereditory or natural  environments .  People are born ugly (which limits 
their earning potentials), mental ly  or physically handicapped,  or born to parents 
who do not care to - or, sometimes cannot  - give proper  guidance to their children. 
Is it just that these young people should be condemned  to a lower status in the socie- 
ty in compar ison with their contemporar ies  who were not  so unfor tuna te  in their 
birth? This is where the proponents  of  distributive justice part company  whith those 
who believe that justice simply implies a strict observance of  a fair set of  rules (see 
Varian, 1975). The proponents  of  'distributive justice'  claim the equality of oppor- 
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tunity,  f r eedom,  wealth and bases o f  self-respect as the very basis of  social justice. 
If we agree with them,  the end-state which emerges f rom such an initial posi t ion of  
'equal i ty '  should  be a fair state. Fur ther ,  if in ano ther  end-state ,  an agent is worse 
off  in compar i son  with the end-state emerging f rom a posi t ion of  equali ty,  we may 
regard thai end-state  to be ' tmfair '  to this agent.  In some sense, the former  end-state 
provides us with m i n i m u m  requirements  of  a fair state. 
For the purpose  of  distr ibutive justice, if Mary and Robert  had assets we would 
have required them to be dis t r ibuted equally. For the sake o f  simplicity we assume 
/ero-asset  posi t ion for both the individuals.  If we accept equali ty in the 'beginning 
oI  state'  as the basis for distr ibutive justice, Rober t  and Mary twhose efficiencies 
differ  because of  natural ,  heredi tory and historical reasons beyond their control)  
must have the right of  equal reward for their labour .  In a total i tar ian society, the 
society may claim the ownersh ip  o f  the individuals '  labour  and offer  each person 
the same wage rate. In a democra t ic  society, the gove rnmen t  can impose a propor-  
tional income tax and a p ropor t iona l  income subsidy in a way that the effective 
wage-rate for both the individuals are same. 
( 1 - t ) w  I (1 +~s)w 2 O_<t_<l. {1) 
Given the same effective wage rate, the revenue realised f rom Rober t ' s  cont r ibu t ion  
may not be equal to the a m o u n t  which Mary needs to fulfil her plan. Let (xj*, ll*) 
and (x: ;~, l*) describe the equi l ibr ium for Robert  and Mar,,, respectively. Please 
note,  we are describing the choice as income- labour  choice rather than income- 
leisure choice.  For nota t iona l  convenience we are describing the choice as (x, 1) 
rather than (x, 1 - 1 ) .  To bring society's budget to balance,  it is required that,  
lWl Ii = SW212. {2) 
Given w~ and w-,, It* and 12" are funct ions  of  t and s. It is possible to show that there 
exisis values o f  t and s which satisfy (1) and (2). In o ther  words,  there exists an 
un i fo rm effective wage rate which brings the society 's  budget  into balance. The 
al locat ion ((x~ :, ll*), (x-~,/2")) cor responding  to this equi l ibr ium un i fo rm effective 
wage rate will hencefor th  be referred to as the allocation under egalitarian wage 
policy (AEWP). If the indif ference curves are convex to the origin, A E W P  is 
i unique.  
Let R s tand for 'preferred  to or equivalent '  and P for 'strictly preferred to ' .  The 
subscript  i refers to the ith individual .  
i Both convexity (strict) of the indifference curves and uniqueness of the egalitarian wage rate w* are 
needed for the uniqueness of AEWP. Theorem 1 proves the existence of w*. We are assuming thai the 
demand for x by any agent obeys the law of demand, i.e., Oxi/Owi>O. In the context of Theorem l, this 
implies that aD/6I<O. In general equilibrium theory, it is well-known that if we allow for 'Giffen- 
goods', the competitive equilibrium may not be unique which raises problems with comparative static 
analysis. A similar problem of comparison also arises here. 
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Definit ion 1. If an allocation A = ((Xl, ll), (x2, 12)) when compared to A E W P  is 
such that  (xi, li)Ri(x*, !*) for all i (i = 1, 2) and (xi, li)Pi(x*, li*) is some i, then A 
is a Weak-Rawls-Fair  allocation. 
Definit ion 2. If an allocation A =((xl, Is), (x2, •2)) is such that,  (xi, li)Pi(x*, I*) for 
all i (i= 1, 2), then A is a Rawls-Fair allocation (see Rawls, 1971, p. 62). 
Definit ion 3. An allocation ((Xl, 11), (x2, •2)) will be called a ' just al location'  if 
(xi, li)Ri(x*, li*) for all i. In defining ' just  al locat ion '  we have used A E W P  as the 
norm. Any allocation, which is at least as good as the allocation under egalitarian 
wage policy, is viewed as a fair allocation. 2 This is in line with the demand for 
distributive justice (initial position of  equality) as discussed earlier. Also note, the 
above definit ion can be extended straight away to cover the case of a finite number  
(N) of  agents. 
Theorem 1. An equilibrium uniform effective wage rate exists if the market alloca- 
tion ((xl, ll), (x2, •2)) is a continuous function of  the tax-rate, t. 
Proof .  Let D=sw212-  tWll ~ be the deficit of  society's  budget associated with a cer- 
tain value of  t. Using (1), 
D = {(1 - t) w I - w 2 } / 2 - tw I ! I = (w ! - w 2 ) i  2 - twl (ll + 12). 
If t = 0 ,  by Eq. (1), s > 0  and, 
D=(w I - w2)!2 > 0. 
If t = 1 - w2/w I , then s = 0 and, 
D = ( w  2 -  wl)l I<0. 
Therefore,  Yt*, 0 <  t*<  1 - w2/w I , such that  D =  0. The equilibrium uniform effec- 
tive wage rate is given by ( 1 -  t*)w ! = w*. [] 
Theorem 2. I f  the indifference maps of  both the individuals are identical then the 
equilibrium uniform effective wage is given by w*= w2+(w I - w 2 ) / 2 .  In other 
words, if the preference orderings of  both the individuals are identical, then the 
egalitarian wage rate will ie halfway between the market wage rates. 
2We are assuming, throughout this paper, that the wage rate reflects the efficiency of labour. If  wages 
are determined by a gambling process, it is possible that AEWP is pareto-dominated by some other pro- 
cess of allocation where the wage rates are (at least partially) determined by a gambling process (see 
Myerson, 1981). In this case, the use of AEWP as the norm of 'just allocation' would be somewhat ar- 
bitrary. Further results examining the relationship between fair division and egalitarianism may be found 
in Thompson (1983). 
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P r o o f .  If the preference orderings are same for both  tile individuals,  at the 
egal i tar ian wage rate w*, l i = l : .  Using (2) we get tw I=sw~. Using this in (1), 
( w ~ - w 2 ) / 2 = s w ~ .  Since by defini t ion w * = ( l + s ) w ~ ,  we get w* ( w ~ - w x ) / 2 + w : .  
i 
Obvious ly ,  the al location of  resources by free marke t  does not satisfy the re- 
qu i rement s  o f  ' just al location'  when the efficiencies of  individuals vary due to 
'h is tor ic ,  heredi tary and natural  reasons ' .  In the regime of  egalitarian wage policy, 
the worst  o f f  will always do better. However ,  it is pert inent  to ask the quest ion,  
whe the r  by imposing lump-sum taxes and subsidies,  a ' just '  pare to-opt imal  alloca- 
tion can be achieved. It is well known,  when the lump-sum transfers are pre- 
a n n o u n c e d ,  the end-state al location is pare to-opt imal .  The quest ion is whether  there 
exists a value o f  lump-sum transfer  so that the end-sta te  al locat ion is ' lus t ' .  From 
Pazner  and Schmeidler  (1974) we know that there may not exist a lump-sum transfer  
value for which the end-state is ' fair '  in Foley 's  (1967) sense. ~ 'e  shall show that 
there exists a value for p re -announced  l ump-sum transfer  for which the end-state  
a l locat ion is ' jus t ' .  Actually,  we prove a s t ronger  result, in case of a two-agent  
e c o n o m y ,  there exists a transfer value for which the end-state  al location is Rawls- 
Fair, i.e., both  the persons are better o f f  in compar i son  with a regime of egali tarian 
wage-policy.  For an N-agent economy,  this existence result can be extended only to 
a W,'eak Rawls-Fair  allocation. 
Let us def ine Tj*=t~'wjll where t~ ~ is the tax-rate imposed on individual  1 
tRober t )  in a regime of  egalitarian wage policy. We shall show that if a t ransfer  of  
Tj* f rom Rober t  to Mary is p re -announced ,  then in the end-stage,  both of  them will 
be better o f f  in compar i son  with an egali tarian wage regime. Note, in a two-agent  
e c o n o m y  T ~ * = -  TJ .  Therefore ,  in a two-agent  economy,  we shall talk about  
l ransferr ing T* f rom Robert  co Mary wi thout  any ambigui ty .  The following defini- 
l ion of  fiar t ransfers  apply to an N-person  economy.  
Definit ion 4. Let T,.*=t*wil ,, where t,* is the tax rate imposed  upon  the ith in- 
dividual  (subsidies are negative taxes) in a regime of  egali tarian wage policy. A 
marke t  e c o n o m y  with p re -announced  transfers  { Tj*, . . . ,  T,~ } is called a Fair Market  
E c o n o m y .  
T h e o r e m  3. The allocation it, a two-agent Fair Market Economy is a Rawls-Fair  
allocation. 
Proof .  Let U~= U,(xi, I - l , ) ,  OU,/Oxi>O, c)U,/Oli<O, describe the utility funct ion  
under ly ing  the preferences of  the ith individual .  Cons ider  an egalitarian wage 
regime with w* as the effective wage rate for both  the individuals  (AEWP).  Since 
both are maxJmising utility, 
dUi=((OUi/Oxi)w*+OUi/Oli)dli=O i=1,2 .  
With the p re -announced  transfer  T( z: in a Fair Marke t  Economy ,  the al locat ion 
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(X,*, [i*) is still available to the ith individual but the wage rate '(the rate of  transfor- 
mat ion between goods and leisure (1 - [i)) is w i. For individual 1 (Robert),  w~ > w*, 
hence 
dU l = ( ( O U 1/Ox 1) w I + O U 1/Ol 1) dl I > O. 
Therefore  individual 1 can increase his utility by working harder.  For, individual 2 
(Mary), w2< w*. Therefore ,  dU2/dl2< O, and Mary will increase her utility by hav- 
ing more leisure. Thus,  in a Fair Market Economy both the agents are better 
off. 
Theorem 3 has been illustrated diagrammatical ly  in Fig. 2. Under  egalitarian wage 
policy, the equilibria of  Robert  and Mary are denoted by a and b respectively. The 
transfer T* (tax to Robert)  is represented by 'am' which is same as Mary 's  subsidy, 
'bn'.  If instead of  an egalitarian wage policy we have a Fair Market  Economy  with 
transfer T*, then Robert  and Mary will choose a '  and b' respectively. Clearly, 
Robert  prefers a '  to a and Mary prefers b' to b. Therefore  (a', b ')  is a Rawls-Fair 
al location.  In Fig. 1, equality of  lump-sum tax on Rober t ' s  income (am) with lump- 
sum subsidy to Mary 's  income is required for balancing the budget of  the economy.  
However ,  its impact on the income-leisure choice of  Robert  and Mary is not going 
to be symmetric,  because subject to the lump-sum transfer ,  both are allowed to 
receive their free-market wages which differ due to differences in productivity.  
There is an implicit result in Theorem 3 which requires our at tent ion.  In a Fair 
Market  Economy,  in compar ison  with an economy with egalitarian wage policy, the 
relatively efficient person works harder  and the relatively inefficient person works 
less. Quite often, this is misinterpreted as an indication of  the laziness of  the ineffi- 
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cient or the poor ly-paid  person.  Nothing  special in Mary 's  preferences indicates that 
Mary  prefers leisure to work in compar i son  with Robert .  The reason,  why Robert  
will work harder  and Mary will work less, lies in the subst i tu t ion effect. Utility-level 
can be increased by working  harder  and consuming  the fruits of  harder  work or by 
x~orking less and having more  leisure. In case of  'efficient Rober t '  the compara t ive  
advan tage  lies in working harder  and consuming  more,  whereas in case of  'han-  
d icapped  Mary '  the relative advantage  lies in enjoying more  leisure. For the sake 
o f  simplicity,  we conf ined our  discussion to a two-person economy.  It is easy to see 
thai our  discussion can readily be extended to cover the case of  a finite number  of  
aeents .  For example,  in T h e o r e m  I we mav define D =  v "  t,w;/ where t / < 0  in 
' ~ ' l = ]  , . 
case o f  subsidy to individual  i. To balance the budget  o f  the society we require D =  0. 
Wi thou t  any loss of  generality,  assume that  individual  1 is most  efficient and the 
Nth individual  is least efficient.  If we set the egali tarian effective wage rate 
w* w I, then D > 0 .  On the other  hand ,  if w*= W,\.., then D < 0 .  Under  the 
a s sumpt ion  of  cont inui ty  of  (wj, l,) with respect to changes in the effective wage 
rate, there must  exist a w* lying between w~ and w\, for which D = 0  I f x , - % t ,  is 
a normal  good  for each i, then w* is also unique.  Note, in case o f  more  than two 
agents  with different  levels of  efficiency, in general the al locat ion in a fair market  
e c o n o m y  is Weakly-Rawls-Fair .  If wj= w*, then t h e j t h  person will neither be tax- 
ed nor subsidized.  Therefore ,  he is as well off  in a fair market  e conomy  as he is 
uncter A E W P .  Anyway,  al locat ion in a fair marke t  e conomy  is a pareto- 
improvemen t  upon  A E W P  so long as efficiency a m o n g  some individuals  differs. 
4. Effort and fairness 
So far we assumed that  the differences in efficiency a m o n g  individuals  are solely 
due to heredi tory  or natural  advantages ,  and engaged ourselves in a discussion on 
how to neutralize this relative advan tage  or privilege. In reality, efficiency is not 
always related only to 'privileges ' .  Past  efforts  to acquire product ive  skills (Z) also 
play an impor t an t  role. This creates a p rob lem for the straight forward  cons t ruc t ion  
of  the fair marke t  e c o n o m y  described in the last section. It is possible that 'eff icient '  
Rober t  may have a preference order ing which makes him more  interested in enjoy- 
ing his early youth .  On the o ther  hand ,  given the same const ra int ,  Mary ' s  preference 
order ing  may induce her to such a degree o f  effort  to acquire  skills, that in the work- 
ing life Mary is more  efficient than Rober t .  In a fair marke t  economy,  as described 
in the previous section, a l u m p - s u m  transfer  will be made  f rom Mary to Robert .  Ob- 
viously, it is unjust  to tax "sincere and hand icapped '  Mary for subsidizing ' fun-  
loving but eff icient '  Robert .  This is clearly the point  raised by Nozick {1974, p. 50). 
In this section, we shall suggest a so lu t ion  to this p rob lem.  In doing so, we shall 
assume that before  deciding upon  the effort-level to acquire skills (Z,), each in- 
dividual  has perfect i n f o r m a t i o n  regarding the tax (subsidy) rate to be applied to 
him. Essentially, it is a pure-s t ra tegy game  with perfect  i n fo rma t ion  played between 
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each individual  and the government .  The quest ion is, does there exist a social 
s trategy in income transfers so that  a fair market  e c o n o m y  prevails? It shall be noted 
that  if the gove rnmen t  adop ted  a mixed strategy in announc ing  transfers or there 
i:, ant '  uncer ta inty  in the svslem, there would be a t iming prob lem as to whether  we 
should  consider  the ex-ante or ex-post utility funct ion  (see Myerson,  1981). 
Since skills can be acquired bt' put t ing in effort  (Zi), the wage rates (w,) must de- 
pend on Z/. We assume,  
I I  
w,=w,(Z,) ,  w,:>0, w i < 0  , i = l ,  "~ 
The  budget  constraints  for the individuals are given by, 
X,. = w i (Z : ) / i ,  O< Z i ,  1:<~ I, i =  1, 2, 
subject  to which they are maximis ing  their utility, 
u,= u,(xi, 1 - l , ,  Zi), i= 1, 2. 
If the funct ions  wi(Z ,) were identical for all the individuals ,  then the market  alloca- 
tion would have been fair. We did not  have to bother  about  distr ibutive justice. 
Since the degree of  herediitory privileges differs f rom individual  to individual ,  the 
lunc t ion  wi(Zi) is not identical for all i. Any tax (or subsidy) imposed on w i affects 
the budget  constra int  which becomes 
x i=  (1 - t,)w~(Z~)l~ 
and consequent ly  the choice of  (w i, 1 - I  i, Zi) is affected.  
Since skills can be acquired by effor t ,  t ransfers  of  income f rom a more  efficient 
person to a less efficient individual  can not be just if ied on the g round  of  ' fa i rness ' .  
For  example ,  suppose  w I = M i n i m u m  (w I, w2), where individual  1 has heredi tory 
privileges but he did not ,.-are to put in enough  effort  to acquire skills. Individual 
2, a l though  hand icapped ,  has acquired high level of  skill with a lot o f  effor t .  It is 
certainly not fair to t ransfer  income f rom individual  2 to individual  1. In a marke t  
economy,  we have to measure  the gap in wages at a cons tant  level of  effort  to 
measure  the impact  of  heredi tory  privileges on product iv i ty .  
Wi thou t  any loss of  generali ty,  suppose  Z~ < Z 2. Let the society' pick up the least 
effor t  level Z~ as the basis for compar ing  the dis tor t ion of  the wage rate caused by 
hcredi tory  advantages .  In the context  of  our  previous discussions,  we assume that  
the society measures  the advantage  of  Rober t  at the effort-level Z =  Min (Z t, Ze). 
T h r o u g h o u t  our  discussion we shall main ta in  this a s sumpt ion .  The reason is, if the 
s tandard  effor t  level Z > M i n  (Zt, Z2) an effort  ad jus ted  fair market  e conomy  may 
not exist. To  illustrate this point ,  let Z = M a x  (Zj, Z s ) = Z ~  and w l ( Z s ) - w s ( Z 2 ) >  
K w I ( Z ~ ) > 0  where K has a large positive value. In words,  Robert  could be much  
more  efficient than Mary if he: did put  in as much  effort  as Mary did. However ,  he 
has put in so little effort ,  that  his wage rate is extremely, low in compar i son  with 
that o f  Mart:. For Robert ,  %(Z2) is an imputed  wage rate vis-a-vis his actual  wage 
fate w~iZ,). If the imputed  wage-rate is much higher than  the actual wage rate, the 
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tax-bill o f  Rober t  may be more  than his wage. Hence,  ' fair '  t ransfers may not be 
feasible. It is possible that  a feasible fair set of  t ransfers  may exist with a choice of  
Z =  (/)(Z~, Z 2 ) > M i n  (Z~, Z 2) but there is no guarantee  that  it will exist. 
Cons ider  the interval I =  [0, 1] and I 2=Ix l .  Define, 
( .  1 Z = (Z  1, Z 2) E 1 ", 
(7.2 Z ' = M i n  (Z~, Z2), 
C.3 w(Z ' )  = (wj (Z') ,  w2(Z')). 
Star t ing f rom an arbitary effort  vector Z, Z '  is the reference {standard) effort  level 
chosen by the  society with reference to which the impu ted  wage vector w(Z ' )  has 
been calculated in a perfect i n fo rma t ion  economy.  Next, we define a mapping  f rom 
reference wages to the fair tax (subsidy) s tructure.  
C.4 t (w(Z ' ) )  : w(Z ' )  --+ t = (tl, re), 
where the fair t ransfer  (tax-subsidy) rates q ,  t2 are explained below. If individuals 
were maximis ing  their utility given the wage-rates w,(Z ' )  but with the given actual 
effort  level Z,,  we could write their choice p rob lem as, 
Maximise u, = ui(xi ,  1 - l,, Zi) ,  
Subject  to: x ,=(1  - t , )w i (Z ' ) l  i. 
By T h e o r e m  1, we know that  there will exist a fair t ransfer-s t ructure ,  provided the 
solut ion x/, /~ is con t inuous  in ti .~ The fair t ransfer  rates will be given by 
(l -- [ / ) w i ( Z ' ) =  w*,  where w* is the un i fo rm  effective wage rate in Theorem 1. 
These are the chosen /i's in C.4. Next, we define the mapp ing  Z(:).  
C.5 Z( t ) : t - -+Z=(Z~,  Z2), where Zj ,  Z~ are derived f rom the solut ion of  the 
p rob lem:  
Maximise  ui = ui(x, ,  1 -- l,, Z i ) ,  
Subject  to: x ,=  (1 - t i )w i (Z , ) l  ,. 
In the above  p rob lem Z i is a choice variable given the paramete r  :,. The construc-  
tions C . I - C . 5  define a mapp ing  f :  12--+1: as follows" 
f : Z ~ Z ' ~ w ( Z ' ) - - , : ( w ( Z ' ) ) - + Z ( t ) ,  Z e l  ~. 
. 12 Obviously,  if there exists a 2 ' e  which is invar iant  under  the mapping  f ,  then 
. , (w(Z ' ) )  is a feasible, fair t ransfer-rate  ( tax-subsidy rate) with the reference level o f  
/Y = Min (Z I, Z2). 
~Since Z ' : M i n  (ZI, Z:), the impu(ed wage rates at-e less than the actual wage rates, i.e., 
% ( Z ' t <  w/(Z,). Therefore, h.mlp-sum tlansl'ers, I i%(~.')[i, are f'ea',;ible, being less than lhe actua[ earn- 
ing wi(Z ,)1,. 
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T h e o r e m  4. In the context qf  selecting a reference /eve/ q /  Z = Min (Z~, Z2), [he, 
mapping j has a f ixed point !f (i) we(Z ,) is continuous in Z,, (ii) [he uni/brm effec- 
Hve wage-rate (w*) in C.4 is continuous in w,(Z') and liii) the choice qf  Z, m c.5 
i.s continuous in tj. 
Proof .  Z ' = M i n  (Zj, Z 2) is con t i nuous  in Z ¢ I - .  By' condi t ions  ti) and (ii) the 
egali tarian wage rate (w ~:) is con t inuous  in Z ' .  Therefore ,  [, = I ~,':::/w, i Z ' )  is con- 
t inuous  in Z. By condi t ion (iii) Z(I)  in C.5 is con t inuous  in Z. This establishes the 
12 cont inui ty  of  the mapping  f .  S i n c e f i s  defined on which is con,,ex and compac t  
in R by Brouwer 's  fixed point  theorem,  the mapp ing  leaves at least one fixed 
12 point Z * ~  . r-. 
I[ is easy to see that the theorem can easily be extended to cover the case of  a finite 
number  o f  agents.  For the purpose  o f  the next defini t ion,  assume Z* to be unique.  
l Ief ini l ion 5. Let T,*(Z*)--:t,*wi(Z*)/,*, where g,* is the tax rate imposed  upon  the 
ith individual  (subsidies are negative taxes) in a regime of  egali tarian wage policy 
with Z-Z*  chosen as the reference level of  Z. A market  e c o n o m y  with pre- 
a n n o u n c e d  transfers (TI*~Z*), ..., T,I~(Z*))is called an Effor t  Adjus ted  Fair Market  
P c o n o m y  (EAFME).  
It is impor tan t  to note  that in an E A F M E  tile privileged person has to pax taxes 
and the relatively hand icapped  person always receives subsidies. However  con- 
, idera t ion is shown to the tax-payer by choosing the reference effort-level (Z) as the 
m i n i m u m  of  the effort  unde r t aken  by the agents in the economy.  
What happens  if Z* is not unique?  The  choice o f  Z*  also determines  the m i n i m u m  
effort  put  up by an individual  in the economy.  If, for example,  Z* has two values 
Z ]  and Z/; ~, * * Z# ), a . - (Z, > technocra t ic  society would perhaps  choose  Z * - Z , ~ '  to 
raise the m i n i m u m  level of  efficiency. In a more  relaxed, less compet i t ive  society 
perhaps  the choice o f  Z*=Z~;* would  be more  appeal ing.  This an issue which is 
related to social values and at t i tudes ra ther  than the principle of  distr ibutive justice.  
5. Conclusion 
We shall conclude by summar iz ing  the cont r ibu t ion  of  this paper.  In all e conomy  
where the product ive  efficiency o f  the individuals  differ ,  Folev 's  concept  of  
"fairness' is known to be nei ther  ' fair '  nor  compat ib le  with pare to  opt imal i ty .  In this 
paper we have character ized a fair marke t  e c o n o m y  which is at least Weakly Rawls- 
Fair. In response to the criticisms laid by Nozick and others,  we have extended the 
concept o f  a fair marke t  e c o n o m y  taking into account  the past efforts  to acquire 
product ive  skills and the sacrifice involved.  The al locat ion in an effort  adjus ted fair 
market  e c o n o m y  is not the only al locat ion which meets the d e m a n d  for distr ibutive 
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justice. However, based on the principle of a rational rectification of hereditorv 
privileges and handicaps, it certainly has an attraction to those who believe in the 
principle of distributive justice. 
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